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NEW SPECIAL PLEADING LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, both federal and state lawmakers have initiated
new special pleading standards applicable to discrete substantive law
claims or to certain remedial requests. Relevant claims include alle-
gations of securities fraud, professional malpractice, childhood sexual
abuse, and civil rights violations, while relevant remedial requests in-
clude punitive damages demands. Generally, these standards require,
at the least, the pleading of significant additional facts not demanded
by the otherwise applicable general pleading standards; in some in-
stances, they also require that pleadings at the outset, or later in liti-
gation, be accompanied by evidence, often involving experts, or special
certificates of merits.2
While often characterized as procedural law reforms, many of
these standards seem better described as substantive law revisions.
Recognition and resolution of troubling procedure/substance dichoto-
mies in these settings is important not only for semanticists, but also
for the legislators, judges, and lawyers developing or utilizing the new
standards. Differentiations are key in at least two contexts - separa-
tion of powers and choice of law. Thus, when dealing with these new
pleading norms, many must resolve who should determine the new
standards and which standards should apply when two interested gov-
ernments have divergent norms. These two contexts will be examined
in this paper.3
This paper initially reviews some of these new pleading standards.
It examines the application of such standards in the separation of
powers and choice of law contexts. Finally, general guidelines will be
1. Such new pleading norms are reviewed in Jeffrey A. Parness & Amy Leonetti,
Expert Opinion Pleading:Any Merit to Special Certificates of Merit?, 1997 BYU L.
REv. 537.
2. These new pleading standards differ from other recent pleading law initiatives
which will not be discussed herein. See, e.g., Amended Order 98-01 of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court, reprinted in Supreme Court Orders, 71 Wis. LAW. 55 (Aug.
1998) (proposed development of standard court forms for mandatory use in civil
actions).
3. Beside applications of substance/procedure dichotomies to these new pleading
laws, those creating or utilizing such laws often must confront other challenges,
such as assuring that constitutionally based access to court and jury trial rights
are preserved. See, e.g., Royle v. Florida Hosp.-E. Orlando, 679 So.2d 1209 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding court access rights are not denied under laws usu-
ally requiring medical negligence claimants to give presuit notices of intent to
initiate medical malpractice litigation and demanding evidence of compliance
upon filing). These substance/procedure dichotomies must also be drawn in other
procedural law rulings. See McDougall v. Schanz, 597 N.W.2d 148 (Mich. 1999)
(finding admissibility standards for expert testimony in medical malpractice
cases may be either procedural rules of evidence or evidentiary rules of substan-
tive law; the legislature may create the latter without intruding on judicial
rulemaking powers).
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suggested for all involved in determining and applying the new special
pleading norms.
II. ILLUSTRATIVE LAWS
Special civil claim pleading standards governing particular claims
or remedial requests have been established recently for both federal
and state trial courts. These standards were formulated by a variety
of lawmakers, and apply in several different settings. They are exem-
plified by the following laws.4
A. Federal Securities Claims
The special pleading standards of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLR) apply to plaintiff class actions arising
under 15 U.S.C. §78a.5 Every plaintiff seeking class representative
status must file a "sworn certification" with the complaint stating: the
plaintiff reviewed the complaint and authorized its filing; the plaintiff
did not purchase the relevant security at the direction of a lawyer or in
order to participate in any private civil action; the plaintiff is willing
to serve as a representative and to provide testimony; the identity of
any other civil action under the same chapter within the last three
years where the plaintiff has sought class representative status; and
an assurance that the plaintiff will not receive any payment for ser-
vice as a class representative beyond a pro rata share of recovery, un-
less it is approved by the court.6
The Act also sets out additional pleading requirements for certain
securities actions where the plaintiff alleges the defendant made un-
true statements of material fact or omitted to state a necessary mate-
4. The illustrative laws are neither exhaustive nor indicative that other claims or
requests for remedies may not soon become subject to new special pleading laws.
See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. §§ 12-2601 to -2602 (Supp. 1998) (claims against con-
tractors, architects, assayers, engineers, geologists, landscape architects or land
surveyors normally require that expert affidavits accompany pleadings);
Bockrath v. Aldrich Chem. Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 851 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(requiring particularized pleading in suits claiming fraud, statutory causes of ac-
tion, and personal injury where the negligence and injury alleged do not natu-
rally give rise to an inference of causation); Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689
N.E.2d 1057, 1104-05 (Il. 1997) (striking statutory certificate of merit require-
ments for product liability claims from other invalid laws within the same Gen-
eral Assembly act as nonseverable, though the General Assembly was free to
reenact the product liability pleading requirements if desirable and appropriate).
5. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-4(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1998). For a critique of how the Act
has failed to strike the proper balance on pleading, in part because of its ambigu-
ity, see Note, What Congress Said About the Heightened Pleading Standard: A
Proposed Solution to the Securities Fraud Pleading Confusion, 66 FoanHA L.
REv. 2517 (1998).
6. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-4(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1998).
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rial fact so as to prevent statements from being misleading.7 Here, a
complaint must "specify" each statement alleged to be misleading, the
reason or reasons why the statement was misleading, and, if the alle-
gation is made on information and belief, the particular facts on which
the belief is formed.8 And in those securities actions in which a plain-
tiff must prove "a defendant acted with a particular state of mind"
before recovering money, the plaintiff must state with particularity
the "facts giving rise to a strong inference that defendant acted with
the required state of mind."9 Dismissal follows for any complaint fail-
ing to meet the heightened pleading requirements of the Act.1o
The passage of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998 generally precluded plaintiffs from filing certain securities ac-
tions in state courts in order to avoid the strict pleading requirements
of the PSLR.1 Specifically, for example, Congress found that since
1995 there had been a shift of securities class action lawsuits from
federal to state courts, preventing full achievement of the objectives of
the 1995 Act and thus requiring "national standards for securities
class action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities."' 2
The substantive elements in the PSLR have not gone unnoticed.
They are viewed as undermining the goal of a "truly neutral" proce-
7. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-4(b)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1998).
8. See id. These requirements have generated some differing applications. See, e.g.,
Coates v. Heartland Wireless Communications, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 910, 916 n.3
(N.D. Tex. 1998) (recognizing a split of authority on whether the Act bans "group
pleading" or the "group published doctrine").
9. 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1998). The Reform Act is silent as to what
the "required state of mind" denotes. To date, many lower courts have found that
recklessness suffices as the required state of mind, with recklessness defined as a
conscious disregard of the truth about a substantial risk. See, e.g., Main v. IVAX
Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 1998); In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F.
Supp. 238, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). But see Janas v. McCracken (In Re Silicon
Graphics, Inc., Sec. Litig.), 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999) ("We hold that
although facts showing mere recklessness or a motive to commit fraud and oppor-
tunity to do so may provide some reasonable inference of intent, they are not
sufficient to establish a strong inference of deliberate recklessness."). On the suf-
ficiency of allegations as to scienter, the cases are reviewed in Matthew Roskoski,
Note, A Case-By-Case Approach to Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 97 MiCH. L. REv. 2265 (1999).
10. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78U-4(b)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1998).
11. Act of November 3, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
12. Act of November 3, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (Section 2: Find-
ings). Not everyone agrees that there was a shift, or with the policy determina-
tions made by Congress to address any shift. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter,
Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud
Causes of Action, 84 CoRNELL L. REv. 1, 99 (1998) ("Congress should not have
passed the Uniform Standards Act until it knew more about critical develop-
ments that would have determined whether preemption was truly necessary.
Furthermore, having decided to preempt state law, Congress should have consid-
ered the precise method of preemption more carefully.").
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dural system.1 3 And they have been read to portend even further
blurring of "the hazy line between substance and procedure" through
congressional "tinkering with procedure" for certain claims in order to
vindicate "substantive purposes."14
B. New Jersey and Georgia Professional Malpractice Claims
A New Jersey statute requires that an affidavit of "an appropriate
licensed person" be filed by a plaintiff in any action for damages re-
sulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a "licensed
person in his profession or occupation" within sixty days following the
date on which the answer is filed.15 The affiant must state that there
is a "reasonable probability" that the conduct alleged in the complaint
"fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards or
treatment practices." 16 A plaintiff can escape the affidavit require-
ment by providing a "sworn statement" that the defendant failed to
provide "information having a substantial bearing on preparation of
the affidavit."17 Failure to comply with the requirements is deemed a
failure to state a cause of action.'S
This New Jersey law can be read to impose delayed, special plead-
ing requirements, often involving evidence, for certain professional
malpractice claims. The New Jersey statute appears under the title
"Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice," a subtitle on "Specific
Civil Actions," and a chapter on "Negligence and Other Torts."19
Here, the broader categories imply the requirements involve proce-
dural law, but the narrowest category suggests they are substantive.
The requirements were enacted as part of a larger tort reform
package. 20
In Georgia, a similar affidavit requirement exists for professional
malpractice actions. It was part of an enactment entitled "Medical
Malpractice Reform Act of 1987" and was "located between provisions
on medical malpractice and health care providers." 2 1 Its particulars
13. See Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Substantive Rights" (in the Rules Enabling Act)
More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 61 (1998).
14. Id.
15. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West Supp. 1999). See generally id. § 2A=53A-26
(West Supp. 1999) (defining licensed persons to include accountants, architects,
attorneys, engineers, physicians and certain health care facilities).
16. Id. § 2A=53A-27 (West Supp. 1999).
17. Id. § 2A:53A-28 (West Supp. 1999).
18. See id. § 2A:53A-29 (West Supp. 1999).
19. Id. § 2A.53A-1 (West 1987).
20. See, e.g., RTC Mortgage Trust 1994 N-1 v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 981 F.
Supp. 334, 346 (D.N.J. 1997); Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barrow, 708 A.2d 401,
405 (N.J. 1998).
21. See Lutz v. Foran, 427 S.E.2d 248, 251-52 (Ga. 1993) (requirement is not invalid
though it is in a bill that includes subject matter not described in the title of the
bill).
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are found in a title on "Civil Practice," a chapter called the "Civil Prac-
tice Act," under an article involving "Pleadings and Motions."22 Here,
the affidavit requirement was not enacted as part of a larger tort re-
form initiative, but as an effort to reduce frivolous malpractice law-
suits.23 There are other significant differences between the New
Jersey and Georgia expert affidavit laws. The affidavit in Georgia
must be completed by an expert who is "competent to testify," be filed
"with the complaint," set forth "at least one alleged negligent act or
omission," and present "the factual basis" for each claim of profes-
sional malpractice.24
C. Medical Malpractice Claims
Outside of New Jersey and Georgia, several states have special
pleading norms applicable only to medical malpractice claims. A
Michigan statute on pleading medical malpractice claims differs from
both the New Jersey and Georgia schemes in that it requires a plain-
tiff, in an action against a health professional or health facility, to give
the prospective defendant written notice of the medical malpractice
claim 182 days before fling.25 The notice must be mailed to the de-
fendant's last known professional business address or residential ad-
dress.26 The notice must contain allegations as to the "factual basis
for the claim," the "applicable standard of practice or care," the man-
ner of the breach, the conduct that should have been taken by the de-
fendant, and the manner in which proximate cause arises, as well as
the names of all other health professionals and health facilities who
have been notified.27 If at any time within the notice period a poten-
tial defendant informs the claimant that it does not intend to settle,
the claimant may then commence an action alleging medical malprac-
22. GA. CODE Am. § 9-11-9.1 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
23. See Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330 (1999) (finding the act does not apply to
claims alleging intentional misconduct); Richard T. Hills, Hewitt v. Kalish: Qual-
ifying as an "Expert Competent to Testify" Under O.C.G-A Section 9-11-9.1, 46
MERCER L. REv. 1537, 1538-39 (1995). For an in-depth analysis of Georgia's pro-
fessional malpractice affidavit requirement, see Robert D. Brussack, Georgia's
Professional Malpractice Affidavit Requirement, 31 GA. L. REv. 1031 (1997).
24. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1(a) (1998). Similar to the Georgia law is an Arizona
requirement that an expert affidavit accompany pleadings containing profes-
sional misconduct claims, though it applies only to those (as architects and engi-
neers) "registered by the board of technical registration." See AIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 12-2601 to -2602 (West Supp. 1998) (also covering claims against
contractors).
25. See MICH. CoMIP. LAws AxN. § 600.2912b(1) (West Supp. 1998). The period can be
shortened to 91 days under certain circumstances. See id. § 600.2912b(3) (West
Supp. 1998).
26. See id. § 600.2912b(2) (West Supp. 1998). Where the address is not readily ascer-
tainable, the notice can be mailed to the facility where the relevant care was
given. See id.
27. Id. § 600.2912b(4) (West Supp. 1998).
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tice. 28 After the notice period has ended, if a plaintiff files an action
for medical malpractice, the plaintiff must attach "an affidavit of merit
signed by a health professional."2 9 The affidavit must certify that the
expert reviewed the notice and medical records, indicate the applica-
ble standard of care, demonstrate how the standard of care should
have been met, and show that the breach was the proximate cause of
plaintiffs injury.30 Plaintiff may be granted additional time to file the
affidavit upon motion for good cause31 or when a prospective defend-
ant fails to allow access to medical records.3 2 The Michigan statute
appears within the "Revised Judicature Act," under a chapter titled
"Provisions Concerning Specific Actions." 33 Its provisions were part of
a broader medical malpractice reform package. 34
The Michigan law differs significantly from other special medical
malpractice pleading requirements. Thus, a very similar provision in
Florida appears under the title "Torts" and in a chapter on "Medical
Malpractice and Related Matters,"3 5 though it too was a part of a
larger tort reform package. 36 In Illinois, one provision of a major med-
ical malpractice reform package was a statute requiring a written re-
port of a reviewing health professional, located within the Code of
Civil Procedure in an article known as Civil Practice.37 A similar
Texas statute was enacted as part of the Medical Liability and Insur-
ance Improvement Act.38 A comparable Minnesota law is found under
the title "Public Health Provisions" and in a section on "Malpractice
Actions: Expert Review."39 In Missouri, an expert affidavit require-
ment for medical malpractice actions claims lies within a section on
28. See id. § 600.2912b(9) (West Supp. 1998) (assuming no limitations period
problems).
29. Id. § 600.2912d(1) (West Supp. 1998) (where a plaintiff is represented by an at-
torney, the attorney must reasonably believe the health professional meets the
requirements for an expert witness).
30. See id.
31. See id. § 600.2912d(2) (West Supp. 1998).
32. See id. § 600.2912d(3) (West Supp. 1998).
33. Id. § 600.2912 (West 1986 & Supp. 1998).
34. See MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2912 (West 1986 & Supp. 1998) (Historical and
Statutory Notes). For an argument that the Michigan notice and affidavit of
merit requirements violate the state separation of powers doctrine as they signifi-
cantly encroach upon judicial authority, see Jeanne M. Scherlinck, Note, Medical
Malpractice, Tort Reform, and Separation of Powers Doctrine in Michigan, 44
WAYNE L. REV. 313 (1998).
35. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999).
36. See Jessica Fonseca-Nader, Florida's Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform
Act: Is it Time for a Change?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 551 (1996).
37. See 735 ILL. ComaP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999).
38. TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (West Supp. 1999).
39. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682 (West 1998). This statute was recently construed in
Lindberg v. Health Partners, No. C2-98-505, 1999 WL 681659, at *6 (Minn. Sept
2, 1999).
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"Statutory Actions and Torts: Tort Actions Based on Improper Health
Care."4 0 And in North Carolina, a special pleading requirement for
medical malpractice claims involving expert opinion pleading appears
in the high court rule on "Pleading Special Matters."4 1
The varying medical malpractice laws differ not only in their desig-
nated locations, but also in their timing and in other substantive re-
quirements. Michigan and Florida have both pre-complaint notice
requirements 4 2 and mandate that expert reports usually be received
at or before the filing of the complaint.43 Missouri and Minnesota
laws only require that expert reports be undertaken by the time of the
filing of the complaint.44 In Texas, an "expert report" must be filed no
later than ninety days after the day the medical malpractice claim is
filed where no cost bond or cash deposit has been tendered.45 In North
Carolina a "complaint alleging medical malpractice by a health care
provider" need only aver that the relevant "medical care" was "re-
viewed" by a person who is reasonably expected to qualify as an expert
witness, 4 6 while in New York the pleading usually must be accompa-
nied by a certificate of merit executed by an attorney and indicating a
consulting physician has been employed.4 7
Regarding other substantive requirements, in Michigan the expert
affidavit accompanying the complaint must certify that the expert re-
viewed relevant medical records and must state the applicable stan-
dard of care, an opinion that this standard was breached, and how the
breach was the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury.48 The Minnesota
and Missouri requirements are similar.49 In Florida the written ex-
pert opinion used by an attorney to demonstrate good faith need only
state that "there appears to be evidence of' medical negligence,50
40. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.225 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999).
41. N.C. R. Crv. P. 9(j).
42. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.203(2) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998); MicH. CoAnp. LAws
ANN. § 600.2912 b(1) (Supp. 1999).
43. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104(1) (West 1997 & Supp. 1999) (stating that receipt
of expert opinion normally should precede filing of complaint); MicH. Coipn. LAws
ANN. § 600.2912d(1) (West Supp. 1998) (requiring that the expert affidavit be at-
tached to the complaint).
44. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.225(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) ([W]ritten opinion of
a legally qualified health care provider"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682(2) (West
1998) (plaintiffs attorney's affidavit that there has been "expert review").
45. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN art. 4590i, § 13.01(a)(3) (West Supp. 1999).
46. See N.C. R. Crv. P. 9(j).
47. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3012-a (McKinney 1991) (also requiring comparable attorney
certificates for dental and podiatric malpractice claims).
48. See MIcH. Coin. LAws ANN. § 600.2912 d(1) (West Supp. 1999).
49. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682(3) (West 1998) (expert must state defendant de-
viated from standard of care causing plaintiffs injury); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.225
(West 1988) (expert must conclude standard of care was breached and breach was
proximate cause of injury).
50. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104(1) (West 1997 & Supp. 1999).
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while in North Carolina the pleading need only aver that the expert
witness "is willing to testify that the medical care did not comply with
the applicable standard of care."51
In contrast to these expert opinion pleading standards for medical
malpractice claims, in Alabama a special statutory pleading norm for
a claim against a health care provider involving a breach of a standard
of care requires only "a detailed specification and factual description of
each act and omission alleged ... to render the health care provider
liable."52 The norm appears in the Medical Liability Act of 198753,
which also contains an array of substantive law provisions.
D. Requests for Punitive Damages
In Florida, any request for punitive damages in a civil action must
be accompanied by an evidentiary demonstration of a "reasonable ba-
sis for recovery."5 4 Before the relevant pleading, the claimant is al-
lowed "discovery of evidence which appears reasonably calculated to
lead to admissible evidence on the issue of punitive damages."55 The
relevant Florida statute is found under the title "Torts," in a chapter
on "Negligence" and in a part on "Damages."
Similar statutory norms exist in other American states.5 6 In both
Oregon and California, comparable provisions are located within codes
of civil procedure.57 The Oregon law applies to all civil actions, while
the California law applies to actions involving alleged professional
negligence by a health care provider. In both Florida and in Califor-
nia, the punitive damages laws were part of a larger tort reform pack-
age. The pleading seeking punitive damages may be in the initial
51. N.C. R. Civ. P. 9(j).
52. ALA. CODE § 6-5-551 (1993).
53. See id. § 6-5-541. What precedent there is finds no separation of powers difficul-
ties with the norm. See Ex Parte McCollough v. Dalraida Health Ctr., Inc., No.
CV-96-1264, 1999 WL 6946, at *7 (Ala. Jan. 8, 1999) (decision not yet released for
publication) (Lyons, J. dissenting).
54. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999). Evidence used may be from
the record or proffered by the claimant with the pleading.
55. Id. However, no discovery of financial worth can precede the filing of the plead-
ing seeking punitive damages.
56. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.13 (West Supp. 1999); IDAHO CODE § 6-
1604(2)(1998); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 549.191 (West 1998); OR. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 18.535 (LEXIS Law 1998 & 1998 Supp. Pt. 1).
57. See CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 425.13 (West 1973 & Supp. 1999); OR. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 18.535 (LEXIS Law 1998 & 1998 Supp. Pt. 1).
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complaint in Florida,5S while in California 5 9 and Oregon6O punitive
damages requests can only appear in amended pleadings.
By contrast, in North Carolina in the article within the Civil Proce-
dure Rules addressing "Pleadings and Motions," there is a provision
on punitive damages indicating that they "shall be specifically stated,
except for the amount," and that the "aggravating factor that supports
the award... shall be averred with particularity."61
E. Childhood Sexual Abuse Claims
In California, a plaintiff twenty-six years of age or older who
presents a civil action for damages suffered as a result of childhood
sexual abuse usually must file two different certificates. 62 The attor-
ney for the plaintiff must declare in a certificate of merit that upon
consultation with a licensed mental health practitioner, "there is rea-
sonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action."63 A certifi-
cate of a licensed mental health practitioner must declare that she is
not a party to the action; did not treat the plaintiff, but did interview
the plaintiff; and has determined "there is a reasonable basis to be-
lieve that the plaintiff had been subject to childhood sexual abuse."64
Failure to file these certificates shall be grounds for dismissal.65 Ini-
tially, in California, it is permissible for the complaint to only name a
John Doe defendant.66 Plaintiff may later move to add the actual
name of the defendant by attaching "a certificate of corroborative fact
executed by the attorney for the plaintiff' to an application to
amend.6 7 This certificate must include the nature and substance of
the corroborative fact, and if supported by the testimony of a witness
or document, the identity or location must be disclosed.6s This certifi-
cate is reviewed in camera. 69 The certificate of corroborative fact is
maintained under seal and thus remains out of reach to the public and
even to the parties in the litigation.70 If the defendant prevails, the
court may inquire into the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs attorney's com-
58. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999).
59. See CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 425.13(a) (West 1973 & Supp. 1999). The court will
not approve the amendment unless the motion is ified within two years of the
complaint or not less than nine months before the first trial date, whichever is
earlier.
60. See OR. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 18.535(2) (LEXIS Law 1998 & 1998 Supp. Pt. 1).
61. N.C. R. Cirv. P. 9(k).
62. See CAL. Cir. PROC. CODE. § 340.1(e)-(f) (West Supp. 1999).
63. Id. § 340.1(f)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
64. Id. § 340.1(f)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
65. See id. § 340.1(j) (West Supp. 1999).
66. See id. § 340.1(k) (West Supp. 1999).
67. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE. § 340.1(1)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
68. See id. § 340.1()(1) (West Supp. 1999).
69. See id. § 340.1(m) (West Supp. 1999).
70. See id. § 340.1(n) (West Supp. 1999).
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pliance with the initial certification standards and may issue sanc-
tions involving "reasonable expenses" upon a finding of
noncompliance.7 1
While in California these special pleading requirements appear
within the Code of Civil Procedure, 72 similar norms in Louisiana ap-
pear in the "Civil Code Ancillaries." 73 While neither law was part of a
broader tort reform package, the California and Louisiana laws differ
in key respects. The California certificates of merit law are demanded
of plaintiffs who are twenty-six years or older at the time the action is
filed, while the Louisiana law applies to plaintiffs twenty-one years of
age or older at the time the action is filed.74 As well, in Louisiana
certificates of merit are also required for claims involving "physical
abuse of a minor resulting in permanent impairment or permanent
physical injury or scarring."75 And in Louisiana, there is no certificate
of corroborative fact required, though the two certificates of merit are
subject to in camera court review before any defendant may be named
in the lawsuit. 76
F. Federal Civil Rights Claims
Other forms of special pleading norms are occasionally employed
for certain federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Since
1993, the possible breadth of such requirements has been uncertain.
Prior to 1993, heightened pleading demands on civil rights claimants
under § 1983 were more widespread.
In the mid 1980s the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit recognized a local common law standard demanding that alle-
gations supporting claims under § 1983 be stated with particularity.
The standard applied to claims against both municipalities77 and indi-
viduals.78 This common law standard relating to claims against indi-
viduals developed, in part, in conjunction with judicial expectations
about requests by individual defendants for more definite statements
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(2).79 The court held a Rule
71. See id. § 340.1(o) (West Supp. 1999); see also id. § 340.1(i) (West Supp. 1999) (vio-
lations by attorneys also "may constitute unprofessional conduct and may be the
grounds for discipline").
72. See CAL. CirV. PROC. CODE. § 340.1 (West Supp. 1999).
73. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.9 (West 1997).
74. See id. § 9:2800.9(B) (West 1997).
75. Id. § 9:2800.9(A) (West 1997).
76. See id. § 9:2800.9(D) (West 1997) (court must find "there is reasonable and meri-
torious cause for filing of the action").
77. See Palmer v. City of San Antonio, Tex., 810 F.2d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 1987) (ex-
tending the rule involving claims against individual governmental officials to
claims against municipal corporations).
78. See Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985).
79. See id. at 1482.
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12(e) inquiry should be initiated by district judges on their own when-
ever a § 1983 complaint "raises the likely issue of immunity."8 0 The
inquiry required the plaintiff to allege "with particularity all material
facts on which he contends he will establish his right to recovery,
which will include detailed facts supporting the contention that the
plea of immunity cannot be sustained."81 The heightened pleading re-
quirement for claims against government officials was adopted as a
response to unfortunate experiences with broadly-worded civil rights
complaints which left to discovery "the development of the real facts,"
effectively eviscerating "important functions and protections of official
immunity."8 2 The public goals sought by official immunity were
deemed not to be "procedural," but rather to be related "to very funda-
mental substantive objectives."8 3 Thus, official immunity could not be
undermined by the application of the general pleading standards of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 4 In creating the common law
standard involving individuals, the court referred to the Enabling
Act85 which mandates that civil procedure rules shall not abridge, en-
large or modify any substantive right.86 In justifying the heightened
pleading requirement, the court also focused on the recent amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the signing of court
papers8 7 and on pretrial conferences.8 8 Their intent was to encourage
federal district judges to become more active managers of the civil liti-
gation process.8 9
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court expressly invalidated
the Fifth Circuit practice, but only as it related to claims against mu-
nicipal corporations. The practice involving municipalities as defend-
ants was deemed contrary to the liberal pleading norms of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.90 Since then, however, many federal courts,
including the Fifth Circuit, still demand particularity in certain plead-
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1476.
83. Id. at 1479.
84. See id.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1992).
86. See Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985).
87. See FED. R. CrV. P. 11.
88. See FED. R. Crv. P. 16.
89. See Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1481 (5th Cir. 1985).
90. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (finding that the heightened pleading standard could not
be squared with the liberal system of notice pleading under the general civil pro-
cedure rules and that the special civil pleading rules did not include provisions on
civil rights claims). Since Leatherman, § 1983 claimants are occasionally found
to have failed to provide even the minimal notice required under the liberal
pleading rules. See, e.g., Kyle v. Morton High School, 144 F.3d 448 (7th Cir.
1998) (holding the claimant in a First Amendment case failed to allege operative
facts on which a claim against the school district was based).
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ings involving § 1983 claims, 91 including claims against government
officials, through newer common law decisions which distinguish the
high court precedent.92 The Supreme Court did say in 1993 that it
had "no occasion to consider whether our qualified immunity jurispru-
dence would require a heightened pleading in cases involving govern-
ment officials."93
The Fifth Circuit pleading practice since 1993 involving govern-
ment officials who are defendants in § 1983 claims is an illustration of
a substance based special pleading norm, that is, of substantive fed-
eral common law. Thus, the practice applies to similar § 1983 claims
filed in state courts within the Fifth Circuit. In some ways this plead-
ing norm is odd in that it has been deemed an appropriate subject for
substantive common lawmaking on pleading though it would be an
inappropriate subject for judicial rulemaking on pleading.9 4
III. DETERMINING AND APPLYING THE SUBSTANTIVE
ELEMENTS OF THE SPECIAL PLEADING LAWS
New special pleading standards for certain claims or for certain
remedial requests often raise problems of creation and application.
Separation of powers issues arise involving who should make the stan-
91. See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1430, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (engag-
ing in "the age-old dance of procedure and substance .... with the music of quali-
fied immunity", court finds that once "the defense of qualified immunity" is raised
in a § 1983 claim, the claimant "ordinarily" must set forth in a reply allegations
"with sufficient precision and factual specificity to raise a genuine issue as to the
illegality of defendant's conduct at the time of the alleged acts"); see also
Breidenbach v. Bolish, 126 F.3d 1288, 1292-1293 (10th Cir. 1997) (not all courts
use the reply as the vehicle for heightened pleading); Veney v. Hogan, 70 F.3d
917, 922 n.6 (6th Cir. 1995) (supporting a heightened pleading standard when
defense of qualified immunity is asserted).
92. At least some of these special common law pleading norms seem wholly proce-
dural in nature and thus more troublesome under Leatherman. Purely proce-
dural laws are wholly concerned with the orderly dispatch of judicial business,
with mechanisms for fair and efficient dispute resolutions. See Kelleher, supra
note 13, at 68-69. For an excellent review of common law special pleading norms
in the federal district courts today, in and outside of procedure and of federal civil
rights claims, see Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Prac-
tice, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 1749 (1998). Professor Marcus concludes that even after
Leatherman, there continues "a kind of common-law activity in which judges de-
velop standards for assessing the complaints in different kinds of cases"; while it
seems "inconsistent with the transsubstantive orientation of the rules," he finds
"it actually comports with the relatively loose wording of the rules." Id. at 1778
(noting the official forms accompanying the federal civil procedure rules "vary in
detail depending on the type of claim asserted").
93. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166-67.
94. See, e.g., Kelleher, supra note 13, at 108-121 (stating under proposed test for
Rules Enabling Act, governing federal judicial rulemaking, the Fifth Circuit
pleading norm for claims against government officials affects impermissibly sub-
stantive rights).
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dards. Choice of law issues also arise when such standards might be
employed in civil actions involving the interests of more than a single
government. In both settings, a procedure/substance dichotomy will
be explored, though the ultimate characterizations can differ in the
two arenas and can differ within the same arena from government to
government. The following cases illustrate the challenges facing those
charged with creating and applying new special pleading norms.
A. Separation of Powers: Who Makes the Law?
1. Legislature or Judiciary?
Significant separation of powers issues can underlie new special
pleading requirements. At times, these requirements arise under
statutes which effectively modify high court rules relating to pleadings
or to attorney conduct. Here, the special statutory norms may be sub-
ject to challenge as infringements on high court rulemaking authority.
Such challenges chiefly occur in American state court settings.95
In Hiatt v. Southern Health Facilities, Inc.,96 the Ohio Supreme
Court found that the state constitution delegated to the high court
rulemaking powers over "practice and procedure in all courts of the
state," subject to only limited oversight by the General Assembly,
which involves the adoption of a "concurrent resolution of disap-
proval."97 The court determined that "all laws" conflicting with high
court general pleading rules were of "no further force or effect." The
court therefore invalidated a statute mandating that any affirmative
pleadings on a "medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic" claim be
supported by documentation, usually involving an affidavit by the
claimant's attorney indicating there had been consultation with an ex-
pert who determined, along with the affiant, that a "reasonable cause"
for the claim existed. The court found the affidavit requirement con-
flicted with the civil procedure rule mandating that a pleading "need
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit" except when "otherwise
specifically provided" by a high court rule.9 8
By contrast, a similar Illinois statute was sustained by the Illinois
Supreme Court in DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital.99 The Illinois
legislation required that a pleading arising out of "medical, hospital,
or other healing art malpractice" usually be accompanied by an affida-
vit of the claimant's attorney indicating that the lawyer had consulted
95. In federal court, challenges to statutes as intrusive upon inherent United States
Supreme Court rulemaking authority are very limited and would involve a small
'undefined area where the Court's authority over procedure is supreme, such as
the core contempt power." Kelleher, supra note 13, at 70.
96. 626 N.E.2d 71 (Ohio 1994).
97. See Hiatt, 626 N.E.2d at 72.
98. Id. at 72-73.
99. 588 N.E.2d 1139 (IlM. 1992).
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with a qualified health professional and that both the consultant and
the affiant had determined that "there is a reasonable and meritorious
cause" for the filing.10 0 In Illinois there is no explicit state constitu-
tional provision delegating civil procedure rulemaking to the high
court. In fact, the high court has consistently found that the General
Assembly may, consistent with the separation of powers principle, im-
pose requirements governing matters of procedure and the presenta-
tion of claims.1o1 In particular, an Illinois Supreme Court rule
recognizes statutes may provide that pleadings "be verified or accom-
panied by an affidavit."102
In New Jersey, a statute requires affidavits of merit for profes-
sional malpractice claims within sixty days of the filing of responsive
pleadings, effectively compelling delayed special pleadings. Recently,
the high court in Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barrow,O3 with very little
analysis, deemed the statute did not raise "significant and imperative
issues of public concern" regarding separation of powers as it could be
accommodated so as not to interfere with judicial authority.104
Neither Hiatt nor DeLuna was mentioned, nor was the New Jersey
constitutional provision delegating to the high court the power to
make rules governing the practice and procedure in all courts in the
state.i0 5
Separation of powers issues involving encroachment by the judici-
ary on the special pleading law prerogatives of the legislature may
also arise, though to date they have not yet appeared. Here, for exam-
ple, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Rules Enabling Act, al-
lowing the United States Supreme Court to promulgate only civil
procedure rules which do not enlarge, abridge, or modify any substan-
tive right,106 would preclude judicially promulgated special pleading
100. See DeLuna, 588 N.E.2d at 1142.
101. See id. at 1144 (stating that these requirements may not unduly encroach upon
inherent judicial powers or conflict with any high court rules).
102. ILL. SuP. CT. RULE 137. In Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (111.
1997), the high court failed to rule on the constitutionality of a special Illinois
pleading statute applicable to product liability claims and containing certificate
of merit requirements since the provision was a part of a series of tort reform
measures containing other invalid provisions which were not severable. See id.
at 1104-05.
103. 708 A.2d 401 (N.J. 1998).
104. See id. at 416.
105. See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2(3); accord Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs., Inc.,
807 S.W.2d. 503, 510-11 (Mo. 1991) (finding a Missouri statute, comparable to the
New Jersey law, valid, where separation of powers issues did not involve who was
the proper lawmaker, but rather whether the need to have an opinion from a
consulting health care provider in a health care services case encroached upon
the inherent function of the judiciary).
106. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994).
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norms (via Advisory Committee assisted or common law rulemaking)
for federal securities claims.10 7
2. Lower Court or High Court?
A second separation of powers issue arising with the promulgation
of new special pleading norms involves relationships between high
court rules and lower court rules. Such an issue arose in Leatherman
v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,108 de-
cided in 1993 by the United States Supreme Court. In Leatherman,
the Court had to resolve whether a federal circuit court could establish
a "heightened pleading standard," for certain civil rights claims
against municipalities, which was more rigorous than general plead-
ing requirements found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 0 9
Here, a "heightened pleading standard" had been applied to claims
seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court found it impossible
to reconcile the local "heightened pleading standard" with the more
liberal "notice pleading" requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 8(a)(2).iio It held that while Rule 9(b) did impose a particularity
requirement for fraud or mistake, it made no mention of civil rights
claims. Thus, the local standard fell.
Yet, the high court in Leatherman did not eliminate the possibility
of any local pleading norms for § 1983 claims. It expressly said it had
"no occasion to consider whether our qualified immunity jurispru-
dence would require a heightened pleading in cases involving govern-
ment officials."' This left the door open for lower federal courts,
primarily through common law procedural rulemaking, to continue to
impose heightened pleading norms for claims against municipal of-
ficers, at least until a national standard was established. For some
lower courts such special norms involving claims against municipal
officers do not conflict with the general civil procedure norms, as did
the special norms involving claims against municipalities; concerns
with "qualified immunity jurisprudence" only arise with claims
against officers, where there may be substance based (and not proce-
dure-based) pleading standards.
107. See Kelleher, supra note 13, at 71 n.98 ("It is the contention of this Article also
that the Rules Enabling Act does not purport to delegate to the Court authority to
promulgate rules in areas where Congress has legislated extensively."); see also
id. at 112-13.
108. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
109. See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 165.
110. See id. at 168.
111. Id. at 166-67.
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B. Choice of Law: Which Law Applies?
New special pleading norms have recently emerged in both federal
and state law settings. At times, a few governments have initiated
differing special pleading requirements for similar claims while others
apply their general pleading norms to the same claims. Because civil
claims arising under the substantive laws of one government are often
presented in the trial courts of another government, significant choice
of law issues can develop regarding conflicting special pleading norms.
1. Federal or State Law?
Sometimes choices must be made between federal and state laws.
The Erie analysis applies when state law claims are presented in fed-
eral district courts, while a reverse-Erie analysis applies when federal
law claims are presented in state trial courts.
a. Erie Analysis
The earlier review of illustrative laws suggests an Erie analysis,
based on the landmark case Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,112 may be
required in several settings, including cases or controversies wherein
federal district courts are presented with state professional malprac-
tice claims, state medical malpractice claims, and requests for puni-
tive damages related to state law claims.
i. Professional Malpractice Claims
On the surface, there appears to be disagreement over the applica-
bility of state heightened pleading requirements governing state pro-
fessional malpractice claims presented in federal district courts. 113 In
Minnesota, one district judge deemed applicable a state statute re-
quiring that attorney affidavits regarding expert reviews be attached
to professional malpractice complaints. 114 The court in Oslund v.
United States115 reasoned that the state law requirements were not
"purely procedural" as they were intended to eliminate nuisance mal-
practice suitsl 1 6 and had a "jurisdictional component" as compliance
failures triggered mandatory dismissals.117 The court stated that
112. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (finding that in diversity cases a federal court must apply
state substantive law and federal procedural law).
113. Compare, e.g., Boone v. Knight, 131 F.R.D. 609 (S.D. Ga. 1990), with Oslund v.
United States, 701 F. Supp. 710 (D. Minn. 1988).
114. See Oslund, 701 F. Supp. at 714.
115. 701 F. Supp. 710 (D. Minn. 1988).
116. See id. at 713-14.
117. See id.
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similar results should obtain for similar claims involving professional
malpractice filed in state and federal courts."i 8
In Georgia, in Boone v. Knight,119 a district judge held that a state
special pleading statute requiring affidavits of experts for professional
malpractice claims was inapplicable in the federal courts. The court
reasoned that the statute was embodied in the civil procedure code
and was essentially a pleading requirement.' 20 The court found this
pleading norm "runs directly afoul" of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8, which requires only "notice pleading."' 2 ' The court relied on cases
under Hanna v. Plummer12 2 which held that where state and federal
pleading norms conflict, federal law controls.123 The court left little, if
any, room for application of state special pleading norms in federal
district courts, seemingly even where the state pleading law is in some
sense "substantive,"' 2 4 as it quoted a noted commentary observing
that the Erie doctrine "has very little application to pleading in a fed-
eral court."' 25
As in Georgia, a New Jersey statute requires an affidavit of merit
by a licensed professional be filed in any civil action involving profes-
sional malpractice or negligence, though it need be filed only after the
defendant has answered.' 2 6 On its applicability in a federal civil ac-
tion, a New Jersey District Court, in RTC Mortgage Trust 1994 N-1 v.
Fidelity National Title Insurance Co.,' 2 7 found that it applied.' 28
That court undertook a lengthy analysis. First, it asked whether
there was an applicable federal civil procedure rule.' 29 If not, the
court would then ask if the application of state law would likely be
outcome determinative.' 30 Even if the application of state law was
118. See id. (noting the "anomalous result" if the state statute was not applied; claims
against the federal government would survive in federal court though similarly
pleaded claims involving similar private conduct by other defendants would not
survive in state or federal court).
119. 131 F.R.D. 609 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
120. See Boone, 131 F.R.D. at 611.
121. Id.
122. 380 U.S. 460 (1964).
123. See Boone, 131 F.R.D. at 611.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 611-12 (quoting CHRI.Es ALAN WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FED-
ERAL CouRTs, 280 (2d ed. 1970)).
126. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2/.53A-27 (West Supp. 1999) (not indicating whether the
affidavit should be viewed as an attachment to an earlier pleading or as part of an
amended pleading).
127. 981 F. Supp. 334 (D.N.J. 1994).
128. See RTC Mortgage Trust, 981 F. Supp. 334.
129. See id. at 340.
130. See id. at 346. The outcome determinative test promotes the twin aims of Erie,
the discouragement of forum shopping and the avoidance of the inequitable ad-
ministration of the laws. See id. at 346-47.
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outcome determinative, federal law would still apply if "overriding
federal interests" were found.131
Plaintiff argued that the New Jersey statute conflicted with Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), requiring only a short and plain
statement, and with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9, requiring par-
ticularity in pleadings in settings not involving professional miscon-
duct.13 2 The court compared the New Jersey statute to the Georgia
statute, found inapplicable in Boone due to its clash with the federal
rules. The New Jersey Court concluded the two state laws were quite
different. In Georgia, an affidavit must be filed with the complaint,
while in New Jersey there was a required filing within sixty days of
the answer. Further, the Georgia law said the affidavit should contain
an account of facts, while the New Jersey law said the affidavit needed
only an opinion as to facts earlier alleged in the complaint.1 33 The
court concluded that the New Jersey statute was not a special plead-
ing norm, as it was "finctionally unrelated, physically separated, and
temporally disconnected from the pleading stage of a case."1 34 In sug-
gesting that affidavit of merit laws would conflict with federal plead-
ing norms if they affected "the mechanics of pleading,"135 the court
provided an illustration of such a conflict, the Florida statute on re-
quests for punitive damages, 136 which "numerous" courts had found to
"interfere" with the federal notice pleading scheme. 13 7 Unlike the
New Jersey law, the Florida statute forbade certain pleading allega-
tions before a reasonable showing of evidence had been made. 135
The New Jersey court also found the New Jersey statute was out-
come determinative. 139 The law was part of "a broad legislative pack-
age to reform New Jersey tort law"140 and evinced "an intent to
determine conclusively the outcome of litigation" in "a limited class of
cases."
14 1
In deciding whether "any overriding federal interests require[d]
the application of federal law,"1 4 2 the court found the only substantial
131. See id. at 347.
132. See id. at 342. The plaintiff also unsuccessfully argued that the New Jersey stat-
ute conflicted with the certified pleading standards of FED. R. Cirv. P. 11. See id.
at 345 (relying in part on the fact that Rule 11 did not require dismissal when
there was a violation).
133. See RTC Mortgage Trust, 981 F. Supp. at 343-44.
134. Id. at 345.
135. Id. at 344.
136. See id. at 344. The statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999),
is reviewed infra, § II.D.
137. See RTC Mortgage Trust, 981 F. Supp. at 344.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 346.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 347.
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federal interest was the maintenance of "the systematic integrity of
the federal pleading scheme,"14 3 an interest deemed not to embody
"an essential characteristic" of the federal court system.144
In Colorado, the federal court in Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench
Holding Corp.145 came to a similar conclusion, though with a different
analysis. As in New Jersey, the relevant Colorado law required a
plaintiffs attorney in a professional negligence case to certify within
sixty days after the filing of a complaint that an expert determined the
claim did not lack "substantial justification."146 Compliance failures
could result in dismissal.147 Under Erie, the court determined the
Colorado law did not collide with any federal law. Although the state
law operated like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the two could
exist "side by side."148 The court reasoned that while the two had sim-
ilar goals, the state law protected "a particular class of defendants,"
thereby vindicating "substantive interests of Colorado not covered by
Rule 11."14 9 The court further found that the outcome determinative
test was met, as the twin aims of Erie would be promoted by federal
court use of the Colorado law.' 5 0 It said the Colorado law was in-
tended to be a "substantive decision" which was "bound up with the
substantive right embodied in the state cause of action."15'
ii. Medical Malpractice Claims
Under Florida law the filing of a claim for medical malpractice usu-
ally must be preceded by notice to any prospective defendant of "intent
to initiate litigation."15 2 The notice may only be sent when the claim-
ant has secured "a verified written medical expert opinion" that cor-
roborates the "reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical
negligence."' 53 In Braddock v. Orlando Regional Health Care System,
Inc.,154 a federal court was urged to apply this law to claims based
upon acts of medical malpractice occurring in a Florida hospital. The
court said it should apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if they
are directly on point, constitutional, and within the scope of the Rules
143. Id.
144. See id. (employing a term from Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S.
415 (1996)).
145. 90 F.3d 1523 (10th Cir. 1996).
146. Id. at 1538 n.9 (quoting COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-20-602).
147. See id.
148. See id. at 1540 (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980)).
149. Id.
150. See id. at 1540-41.
151. Id. at 1541.
152. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.106(2) (West 1997 & Supp. 1999).
153. Id. § 766.203(2) (West 1997).
154. 881 F. Supp. 580 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
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Enabling Act.155 If a federal rule is not on point, the court should
consider the twin aims of Erie.156 The defendants who urged the stat-
ute's applicability primarily relied on rulings by Florida state courts
finding the notice requirements were substantive;157 the state courts
had found a legislative intent "to promote the settlement of meritori-
ous claims at an early stage without the necessity of a full adversarial
proceeding," a goal deemed "primarily substantive in nature." 5 8 The
Braddock court stated that these state court decisions were not bind-
ing and that the federal court must make its own determination under
Erie.15 9 The court found controlling a federal appeals court deci-
sion1 60 determining that a Florida statute requiring a plaintiff to wait
six months to file a civil action after notifying a defendant of a claim
was procedural.161 The appeals court held the Florida statute was
procedural under Erie as it directly conflicted with Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 3 and 4.162 Rule 3 states a civil action is commenced
with a complaint16 3 while service of process under Rule 4 was said to
provide adequate notice about the filing of a complaint.164 As a re-
sult, the Braddock court held the Florida statute on prefiling notice of
medical malpractice claims should not be applied in federal court.165
The Braddock court did not follow another federal appeals court deci-
sion deeming applicable in federal court a state statute establishing
compulsory prelawsuit mediation for medical malpractice claims.16 6
Without explanation, the Braddock court suggested statutes requiring
prelawsuit "specialized panel" proceedings were not "specialized hur-
dles for filing particular causes of action," as were the medical mal-
practice notices of intent to initiate litigation.16 7
The Braddock court next turned to the special pleading require-
ment in the Florida statute that demanded an affidavit from a medical
155. See Braddock, 881 F. Supp. at 583.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 582.
158. Id. (quoting Williams v. Campagnulo, 588 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1991)).
159. See id. at 583 (stating federal courts are "final arbiters," though state court deci-
sions might be "persuasive").
160. See Lundgren v. McDaniel, 814 F.2d 600 (11th. Cir. 1987).
161. See Braddock, 881 F. Supp. at 584.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 583 (reviewing Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir.
1979)).
167. Id. Compare id., with McKenzie v. Hawaii Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 29 F.
Supp. 2d 1174, 1177 (D. Haw. 1998) (holding state law requirement that claims
against health care providers proceed through medical claim conciliation panels
before lawsuits may be filed are procedural under Erie).
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expert be attached to any complaint.' 68 The court compared this affi-
davit to a Florida law which required that the publication of a defama-
tion be pled with particularity.16 9 That defamation law had been
deemed inapplicable in federal court because it conflicted with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires only notice pleading.7o
The Braddock court said that the "heightened pleading requirement
for medical malpractice cases should be treated in the same
fashion."171
Special pleading norms for medical malpractice claims are not al-
ways deemed procedural under Erie as was done in Braddock. Thus,
in Finnegan v. University of Rochester Medical Center,17 2 a federal
court found the New York statute 73 requiring a certificate of merit by
a plaintiffs attorney in a medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice ac-
tion to be "substantive law that applies in a federal diversity ac-
tion."' 74 However, there the court simply agreed with earlier
precedents involving Connecticut, Maryland and Illinois laws, failing
to compare the statutory requisites or to examine contrary authority
such as Braddock.
iii. Punitive Damages Requests
In Florida, punitive damages requests in pleadings must be accom-
panied by an evidentiary demonstration of a "reasonable basis for re-
covery."175 Several federal district courts have addressed the
applicability of this norm in a federal court.'7 6 Among the precedents
finding that the law is procedural, and thus inapplicable in federal
court, is Citron v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.17 7 In Citron, a
judge in the Southern District of Florida said the law "is clearly a
pleading statute and, indeed, is labeled as such."l78 There, the court
168. See Braddockv. Orlando Reg'l Health Care Sys., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 580, 584 (M.D.
Fla. 1995).
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. 180 F.R.D. 247 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
173. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3012-a (McKinney 1991).
174. Finnegan, 180 F.R.D. at 249.
175. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999) (stating evidence may origi-
nate in the record or be proffered by a claimant with the pleading). The law was
added in 1986. See Citron v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1259,
1260 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
176. For a review of Florida case law, see Rhett Traband, An Erie Decision: Should
State Statutes Prohibiting the Pleading of Punitive Damages Claims Be Applied
in Federal Diversity Actions?, 26 STTSnoN L. REv. 225 (1996). Recently, a federal
appeals court found the norm inapplicable in federal diversity actions. See Cohen
v. Office Depot, Inc., 184 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1999).
177. 721 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
178. Citron, 721 F. Supp. at 1262.
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also found the statute was "in direct conflict with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(g)" which requires a plaintiff to state specifically punitive
damages items in the complaint.179 The court opined that even if the
state and federal pleading laws were not in direct conflict, "no inequi-
table administration of law" would result from a failure to use the
state law in federal court because "the only practical difference...
relates to the posture in the lawsuit in which a court decides whether
a claim for punitive damages is appropriate."' 8 0
Within a few years of Citron there were several other decisions on
the same issue by different judges in the same federal district, with
differing analyses and outcomes. In Tutor Line Child Care Systems,
Inc. v. Franks Investment Group, Inc.,181 a second judge found the
Florida statute conflicted with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) (on
notice pleading) as well as with Rule 9(g),18 2 though it said that other
judges had found one, but not the other, 183 federal rule in conflict, and
that two judges found no conflict at all.184
While federal district judges in one district in Florida disagreed on
the applicability of the Florida law on pleading punitive damages in
federal court, Florida federal judges all agree that a related Florida
law found within the same statute and involving limits on discovery of
financial worth was applicable in federal court.'8 5 The related law
says "no discovery of financial worth shall proceed until after the
pleading concerning punitive damages is permitted."18 6 The place-
ment of the pleading and discovery laws within a single enactment
was important to at least one federal court undertaking an Erie analy-
sis regarding the special pleading law. In Teel v. United Technolgies
Pratte Whitney,187 the court found the pleading and discovery provi-
sions were inextricably intertwined in that there was no ready distinc-
179. Id. at 1261.
180. Id. at 1262.
181. 966 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
182. See id.
183. See id. at 1190 (citing Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Plantation Square Assocs., 761 F.
Supp. 1569, 1573 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (finding a conflict with Rule 8(a) but not 9(g))
and Citron v. Armstrong World Indus., 721 F. Supp. 1259, 1262 (S.D. Fla. 1989)
(finding a conflict with Rule 9(g) but not 8(a))).
184. See id. (citing Teel v. United Techs. Pratt & Whitney, 953 F. Supp. 1534, 1539
(S.D. Fla. 1997) and Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 507, 512-13 (S.D.
Fla. 1993)).
185. See Teel, 953 F. Supp. at 1536 ("[Tlhere is universal agreement that the discovery
component applies as substantive law for claims in federal court which arise
under Florida law."). But see Oakes v. Halverson Marine Ltd., 179 F.R.D. 281,
286 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that comparable California law limiting discovery of
defendant's financial worth is procedural and inapplicable in federal court).
186. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999).
187. 953 F. Supp. 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
[Vol. 78:412
NEW SPECIAL PLEADING LAWS
tion "in practice" for the two components.' 8 8 That court also found
important, though not conclusive, the placement of two laws in stat-
utes rather than in court rules, as it was "typical" for Florida Statutes
to be "the source of substantive rights" and for "procedural law" to be
"reserved to the Supreme Court of Florida."189 Thus, the Teel Court
found both the pleading and discovery laws applied in federal court.
Similarly, in Neill v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc.,i 90 a federal judge
found the pleading law to be substantive and applicable in federal
court under Erie, in part because it found the law was "not simply an
isolated provision related to judicial procedure, but is instead a part of
a cohesive and comprehensive statutory scheme establishing the sub-
stantive law of the state."19 1 The law was "a part of the Florida Tort
Reform and Insurance Act of 1986," and the pleading law was "only
one feature of an even broader statutory scheme addressing damages
in general."19 2
b. Reverse-Erie Analysis
Where Congress or some federal court adopts special substance
based pleading requirements for federal claims which can be
presented in state courts, the potential for a reverse-Erie analysis
arises. Recently, Congress recognized the difficult reverse-Erie
problems arising from the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 by passing the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998.193 The Act restricts state court lawsuits involving private fed-
188. See id. at 1541. The court also referred to the close, and perhaps even indivisible,
link between federal pleading and federal discovery. See id. at 1540.
189. Id. at 1540; see also Marcus v. Carrasquillo, 782 F. Supp. 593, 600 (M.D. Fla.
1992) (citing a Florida constitutional provision allowing high court practice and
procedure rules, though failing to note that such rules may be repealed by a
supermajority in the General Assembly, FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a)). See generally
Jeffrey A. Parness, The Legislative Roles in Florida's Judicial Rulemaking, 33
FLA. L. REV. 359, 360 (1981) (stating that the Florida legislature has played "an
active, even primary role in the promulgation of controversial, issue-laden proce-
dural rules").
190. 966 F. Supp. 1149 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
191. Neill, 966 F. Supp. at 1152.
192. Id.; see also Pruett v. Erickson Air-Crane Co., 183 F.R.D. 248, 250-51 (D. Or.
1998) (finding Oregon punitive damage pleading statute inapplicable in federal
diversity case).
193. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified in scattered portions of 15 U.S.C.). For a brief review
of the Act, see Gregory P. Joseph, Federal Practice: Securities Pleadings, NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 9, 1998, at B15. A more comprehensive review appears in David M.
Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998: The Sun Sets on California's Blue Sky Laws, 54 Bus. LAW. 1 (Nov. 1998),
while a critique of the Act appears in Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False
Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CoR-
NELL LAw REv. 1 (1998).
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eral securities fraud claims and was motivated, in part, by the percep-
tion that such federal claims were being commenced in state courts in
order to avoid the strict pleading requirements mandated by the 1995
Reform Act.1 9 4 For example, under the 1995 Act a plaintiff alleging
that a defendant made an untrue statement must "specify each state-
ment alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the
statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement
or omission is made on information and belief,... all facts on which
that belief is informed."195 The negative effects of state court lawsuits
involving private federal securities fraud claims under the 1995 Act
were said to include: 1) a lack of uniformity in federal securities litiga-
tion; 2) an abridgement of the safeguards provided defendants under
the 1995 Act; and 3) the frustration of the intent of the 1995 Act to
curb abuses in securities fraud lawsuits.
State trial court failures to utilize the special pleading standards of
the PSLR seem wrong. In Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama, 196
a plaintiff commenced an action in negligence in a Georgia state court
to recover damages for personal injuries under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA). Plaintiff failed to survive a challenge to the
complaint under a Georgia rule that required that pleading allega-
tions be construed most strongly against the pleader, which was inter-
preted to require here that plaintiff allege the relevant accident was
unavoidable and the defendant was negligent.197 Yet, plaintiff did
meet the standard under federal court precedents requiring that
presentations of federal statutory claims be made "plainly and reason-
ably."1 98 The United States Supreme Court concluded that the FELA
claim could not be defeated by the local Georgia procedures because
otherwise "desirable uniformity in adjudication of federally created
rights could not be achieved."1 9 9 While the dissent found the Georgia
194. See Levine & Pritchard, supra note 193, at 7. Also of concern was the perceived
avoidance of the safe harbor and discovery stay provisions of the 1995 Act.
195. 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-4(b)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1998).
196. 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
197. See Brown, 338 U.S. at 295.
198. Id. at 299.
199. Id.; see also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141 (1988) (requiring, under state law,
in all civil actions against local governmental entities, a notice of claim and 120
day wait; this state law was inapplicable in § 1983 cases in state courts as "en-
forcement... will frequently and predictably produce different outcomes in fed-
eral civil rights litigation based solely on whether that litigation takes place in
state or federal court"); Kelleher, supra note 13, at 64, n.73. Kelleher, citing Fel-
der and Brown as authority, notes:
Substantive federal common law is binding on state courts under the
Supremacy Clause .... A federal procedural rule, by contrast, normally
will not be applied by a state court, even in a matter as to which federal
law controls the substantive outcome. In some such matters, however,
the federal procedural rule will be considered part of the substantive fed-
eral law, and thus binding on state courts.
[Vol. 78:412
NEW SPECIAL PLEADING LAWS
procedures to be "finicky" and "to reflect something of the pernicket-
ness with which seventeenth-century common law read a plead-
ing,"2 00 it also found them applicable to "all" civil litigation in the
Georgia courts (i.e., state and federal claims) 2O1 and to constitute pro-
cedural law under the "controlling considerations" applicable in an
Erie setting which presents "essentially the same kind of problem"202
as is presented in a reverse-Erie setting.
2. Whose State Law?
At times choices must be made between the conflicting special
pleading standards of two different states. A claim under one state's
law may be presented in another state's court, or a claim chiefly under
one's state law may nevertheless implicate particular substantive law
policies of another state, as when a party is a citizen of the other state
and has acted in that state. Often, though not always, the choice be-
tween competing state laws is made upon a Full Faith and Credit
Clause analysis. 2O3
Of course no such analysis is required when false conflicts are
found. Thus, in RTC Mortgage Trust 1994 N-1 v. Fidelity National
Title Insurance Co.,204 a federal court in New Jersey was asked to ap-
ply a special New Jersey pleading requirement in a professional mal-
practice case against an out-of-state law firm that acted in New
Jersey. The federal court predicted that the New Jersey Supreme
Court would determine that the New Jersey statute would not apply
in such a case.20 5 The court reasoned that the New Jersey statute
expressly applied to "a licensed person admitted to practice law in
New Jersey."206 As the defendant law firm did not maintain a "bona
fide office for the practice of law" in New Jersey, as was required by
the State of New Jersey for those qualified to practice law there,20 7
the defendant was not licensed in New Jersey and so was not covered
by the New Jersey statute.20 s
Similarly, in Braddock v. Orlando Regional Health Care System,
Inc.,209 a Florida federal court heard a medical malpractice claim by a
Michigan plaintiff against a Florida hospital and two Florida doctors
Id.
200. Brown, 338 U.S. at 301, 303 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
201. See id. at 301 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 302 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
203. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts... of every other State.").
204. 981 F. Supp. 334 (D.N.J. 1997).
205. See RTC Mortgage Trust, 981 F. Supp. at 348.
206. Id. at 339 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2Az53A-27 (West Supp. 1999).
207. Id. at 348.
208. See id. at 349.
209. 881 F. Supp. 580 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
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which arose out of medical treatment provided in Florida. Here, no
one even questioned the possible use of Michigan law, as the only is-
sues were the applicability in a federal court of a Florida statute re-
quiring prelawsuit notices to the defendants (effectively mandating a
time for settlement talks without any litigation)210 and a Florida stat-
ute requiring that an affidavit from a medical expert be attached to
any complaint.211
In Braddock, had the Florida federal court determined state law on
pleading applied and, under Erie, looked to both Florida and Michigan
pleading requirements as the Florida state courts would have done, 2 12
arguably significant differences in the two state laws would have ap-
peared. While each state generally requires both prelawsuit notices to
potential defendants and affidavits of consulting health professionals
accompanying complaints, the affidavits demanded in Michigan must
be much more detailed than those required in Florida.213
IV. GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE SUBSTANCE BASED
NEW SPECIAL PLEADING LAWS
Special pleading standards applicable to discrete substantive law
claims or to certain remedial requests often raise difficult questions
involving procedure/substance dichotomies. Such questions involving
substance based pleading laws must be determined in at least two
contexts-separation of powers and choice of law. The following
guidelines for those creating or applying substance based pleading
laws emerge from a review of some of the new special pleading norms
and their judicial precedents.
Initially, it should be noted that many special pleading norms are
difficult to locate, as they frequently do not appear alongside other
special pleading standards and there are few cross-references. Thus,
civil procedure rules and codes typically contain within a single sec-
210. See Braddock, 881 F. Supp. at 582-84.
211. See id. at 584. Comparably, in Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90
F.3d 1523 (10th Cir. 1996), seemingly no one questioned the possible use of Mich-
igan, Florida or Nevada laws, but assumed Colorado law on attorney certificates
regarding favorable expert reviews of attorney professional negligence claims
would be chosen by a Michigan state court for a claim assumed to be heard in a
Colorado court, brought by a Florida citizen, and involving business done in
Michigan based upon an opinion letter given by a lawyer who was not a Michigan
citizen but who was general counsel for a Nevada corporation.
212. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (holding when Erie
compels use of state law, applicable state law is chosen under forum state's con-
flict of law rules).
213. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104(1) (West 1997 & Supp. 1999) (expert opinion
need only state "there appears to be evidence" of negligence), with MicH. Comp.
LAws ANN. § 600.2912d(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 1999) (expert affidavit must ad-
dress review of medical records; applicable standard of care; and proximate
cause).
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tion both general and special pleading norms; yet often, additional
special norms for discrete substantive law claims and for certain re-
medial requests appear elsewhere because there is a different
lawmaker or a different lawmaking process. Thus, the special plead-
ing standards for Illinois healing art malpractice claims, including re-
quirements involving an affidavit from a plaintiffs attorney and a
written report by a health professional, appear in the Civil Procedure
Code, in the Part on Pleading.2 ' 4 Comparable standards in Florida
appear in a statutory chapter on medical malpractice under the title
"Torts."215 The special pleading standards for punitive damages in
Florida appear in a statutory chapter on negligence, under the title
"Torts,"216 while in North Carolina they are found in the Civil Proce-
dure Rules.2 i 7
Further, special pleading norms not only are difficult to locate, but
also to differentiate from each other and from other special norms hav-
ing little to do with the contents of pleadings. Thus, in RTC Mortgage
Trust, the federal court found that a certificate of merit which was
related to, but filed after, a pleading was not itself a part of an initial
pleading.218 Seemingly, there was no such recognition by the federal
court in Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp.2 19 The need
for a later filed certificate may be reasonably viewed as a delayed, spe-
cial pleading requirement; as a form of a required amended pleading
(or part thereof); or as a necessary filing which constitutes no part of
any pleading (and perhaps is related to a court-initiated summary
judgment proceeding or to a compulsory discovery disclosure norm
which operates without a discovery request by a party).
Finally, special pleading norms may themselves need to be differ-
entiated as they may dictate that there be particular contents for cer-
tain pleadings for a variety of reasons. Some norms seek only to
provide more detailed information to adverse parties and to the trial
court than would otherwise be presented, thus addressing a function
typically promoted by procedure based pleading laws.220 Others may
214. See 735 ILL. CoMiP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999).
215. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999).
216. See id. § 768.72 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999).
217. See N.C. R. Cirv. P. 9(k).
218. See supra notes 126-44 and accompanying text ("[The affidavit was] functionally
unrelated, physically separated, and temporally disconnected from the pleading
stage.").
219. 90 F.3d 1523 (10th Cir. 1996); see supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text
(noting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, on certifying pleadings, could exist
"side by side" with the state affidavit requirement). The certification in RTC
Mortgage Trust was to be filed by "an appropriate licensed person," 981 F. Supp.
at 339, while the certification in Trierweiler was to be usually filed by the plain-
tiffs attorney, 90 F.3d at 1538, n.9.
220. The purpose may not be to inform better adversaries and judges, but to "enable
courts to decide cases on their merits" more expeditiously by creating special
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seek to mandate special attorney conduct, including evidence assem-
bly, prior to pleading presentations, 22 1 thus modifying the procedure-
based general "reasonable inquiry" standard applicable to civil litiga-
tion papers.2 22 Yet others may be primarily directed to reducing the
presentation of certain civil claims disfavored under prevailing sub-
stantive law. Any recorded legislative history should not solely con-
trol the search for rationale(s), as lawmakers may at times seek to
skirt separation of powers restrictions; rather, history must be as-
sessed with a keen analysis of how and on whom the special pleading
norm will operate. As well, differing locations of the same pleading
requirement should not always control the search for rationale(s).
Placement of pleading norms within a series of tort law standards
does not always indicate the pleading norms are substantive, since
legislatures often have the power to make both civil procedure and
substantive laws and are not required to locate all civil procedure laws
within the code of civil procedure or to locate all substantive laws
outside the civil procedure code. 2 23
Wherever located and whatever their rationale, separation of pow-
ers questions regarding these special pleading norms can arise as civil
procedure or attorney conduct lawmaking may be constitutionally
vested in the judiciary while lawmaking involving recovery on tort,
contract, sexual abuse and other civil claims lies primarily in the leg-
islature. Procedure/substance dichotomies are required, and espe-
cially problematic, where, for example, civil procedure or attorney
conduct lawmaking is within the exclusive province of the high court,
but where statutory pleading norms are tied to particular civil claims.
They are also difficult, yet needed, where attorney conduct lawmaking
is within exclusive high court authority, but where the civil procedure
pleading norms for claims where the requirement of more detail will often reveal
fatal defects in claimants' presentations or the absence of any substantive law
violation. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUm. L. REv. 433, 436 (1986).
221. Compare, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999) (requiring pu-
nitive damages pleadings to be accompanied by an evidentiary demonstration of
"a reasonable basis for recovery"), with N.C. R. Crv. P. 9(k) (requiring that puni-
tive damages "shall be specifically stated, except for amount," with particular
averments as to any "aggravating factor" necessary).
222. See McAlister v. Schick, 588 N.E.2d 1151, 1157-58 (Ill. 1992) (noting that if a
healing art malpractice lawyer cannot satisfy the special attorney certification
and expert opinion standards, "it is unlikely" that the lawyer will be able to fulfill
the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 137, which usually requires the plain-
tiffs attorney to certify that, to the best of the attorney's knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the pleading is well-grounded in fact).
223. While location of special pleading norms is important it should not always control
the search for applicable policy, placement of special pleading norms within a
statutory section of civil procedure or torts is also important, but not dispositive,
elsewhere, as where judicial rules may supercede statutes on procedure but not
substantive law statutes. See Kelleher, supra note 13, at 87.
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lawmaking powers are shared by the legislature and the judiciary.
Here, a detailed analysis of a single government's allocation of law-
making duties, both through the relevant constitution and via delega-
tions of authority, is needed without much reference to the separation
of powers doctrines employed elsewhere in America, since American
governments usually differ significantly in their assignments of law-
making authority.2 24
Separation of powers analyses are required not only when judicial
rules on pleading applicable throughout the trial courts of a single
government seemingly clash with statutory directives both within and
outside any civil procedure code, but also when such judicial rules ap-
parently conflict with the local court rules or with the common law
precedents of a lower court. The Leatherman decision and its prog-
eny,22 5 for now anyway, illustrate how local laws may not be gener-
ated when there will be conflict with the general and special civil
procedure pleading norms applicable everywhere, but how some local
substance based precedents involving pleading duties may arise
notwithstanding civil procedure pleading norms of widespread
application.
Choice of law questions involving substance based special pleading
norms can arise in Erie, reverse-Erie, and choice of state law settings.
While each setting is comparable in that a trial court of one govern-
ment must initially decide whether to apply its own pleading law or a
special pleading law of another government to a claim arising under
that other government's substantive law, usually entailing a proce-
dure/substance dichotomy, these procedure/substance inquiries need
not yield the same results. Thus, a law which is procedural in one
setting may nevertheless be substantive in another setting.22 6
Though the three settings may produce differing characterizations,
all choice of law inquiries should be guided by at least some common
principles. First, even though deemed by lawmakers as "pleading"
norms, federal and state laws dictating what must be alleged in, or
attached to, pleadings can be so grounded in the substantive law poli-
cies underlying certain civil claims or defenses, or classes of civil
claims or defenses, that they should be viewed as substantive for
choice of law purposes. Labels employed by lawmakers are not dispos-
224. Such an analysis appeared in both Hiatt and DeLuna, but not in Cornblatt, when
special medical malpractice pleading norms were challenged on separation of
powers grounds. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text; see also Finne-
gan v. University of Rochester Med. Ctr., 180 F.R.D., 247, 249 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)
(failing to recognize different rationales and lawmakers may be involved in simi-
lar certificate of merit laws).
225. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 756-58 (1st Cir. 1940) (stating
under Erie, burden of proof is substantive, while under Massachusetts choice of
law rules same burden of proof is procedural).
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itive. Thus, a designated "pleading" law found within a statutory sec-
tion on torts, which was enacted as a part of a tort reform package and
which has withstood a separation of powers challenge, should nor-
mally be viewed as substantive for choice of law purposes, especially
when the law is viewed by its makers as "jurisdictional"22 7 and "bound
up"2 2 8 with the relevant substantive law. Functions rather than la-
bels are often key.
Second, false conflicts must be recognized. At times, upon first
glance the pleading laws of two relevant governments may appear to
clash as their requirements differ, even significantly. However, upon
close examination, the direct collision can evaporate. For example,
one of the two laws can be inapplicable. A civil procedure rule in one
state is usually deemed to apply only in the courts of that state, and
thus (comity aside) need not usually even be considered for use by the
courts of another state.2 29
Third, in assessing whether there are any conflicts, forum courts
should not assume that potentially competing laws from elsewhere are
located or designated comparably to their own laws. It is not enough,
if the special medical malpractice "pleading" norms within the forum
are located in the civil procedure rules in the section on pleadings and
motions, for the court to examine whatever special "pleading" stan-
dards are found in the comparable provisions of the civil procedure
rules or code of any other interested government. American govern-
ments differ in their constitutional delegations and nonconstitutional
assignments of procedural and substantive lawmaking powers on
matters related to civil litigation papers as well as in their placements
of relevant laws. Consider, for example, that via statutes the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure usually are to be initially prescribed by the
United States Supreme Court,230 may be altered by Congress,231 but
may not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right";232 that
via the state constitution the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
are within the province of the General Assembly, 23 3 but that much
rulemaking authority may be (and has been) delegated to the
Supreme Court 234 and that civil procedure rules can impact upon sub-
227. Oslund v. United States, 701 F. Supp. 710, 714 (D. Minn. 1988).
228. Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1541 (10th Cir.
1996).
229. See, e.g., N.C. R. Civ. P. 9(j) (special pleading norms for medical malpractice com-
plaints); N.C. R. Civ. P. 1 (rules govern procedure in North Carolina superior and
district courts).
230. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994).
231. See id. § 2074(a).
232. Id. § 2072(b).
233. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2).
234. See id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-34 (1995) (stating Supreme Court rules for superior
and district courts may be "supplementary to, and not inconsistent with, acts of
the General Assembly").
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stantive rights, at least where the rules originate in the General As-
sembly;23 5 and that via the state constitution the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure are adopted by the Supreme Court, though they "may
be repealed by general law enacted by two thirds vote of the member-
ship of each house of the legislature" and may only address matters of
"practice and procedure." 236
V. CONCLUSION
Recently there have emerged new special pleading standards ap-
plicable to discrete substantive law claims or to certain remedial re-
quests. These norms often raise troubling procedure/substance
questions in separation of powers and choice of law settings. The
questions are especially difficult where the standards are hard to lo-
cate; to distinguish from nonpleading laws; and to differentiate by
rationale(s).
In the separation of powers setting, these questions must be ap-
proached only after undertaking a distinct and detailed analysis of
each relevant government's allocation of lawmaking duties. American
governments differ significantly in these allocations.
In the choice of law setting, these questions can arise in circum-
stances involving Erie, reverse-Erie and choice of state law. The pro-
cedure/substance issues here must be approached only after
undertaking a close look at functions, not labels; at the possibility of
false conflicts; and without a parochial view as to the possible location
or designation of the special pleading norms of other interested
governments.
235. See, e.g., N.C. R. Civ. P. 9(j) (medical malpractice complaints); see also N.C.
CONST. art. IV, § 13(2) (practice and procedure rules cannot "abridge substantive
rights" or limit the jury trial right).
236. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a). For a review of the interplay between the legislature
and high court under this provision, see Jeffrey A. Parness, The Legislative Roles
in Florida's Judicial Rulemaking, 33 U. FLA. L. Rav. 359 (1981).
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